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MICHIGAN v. MOSLEY: A FURTHER
EROSION OF MIRANDA?
On January 31, 1976, Ernesto Miranda was stabbed to death in
a Phoenix bar.' As the life drained from Miranda, the lifeblood
was also being drawn from the doctrine that bears his name. Only
ten years after its rendition in 1966, the foundations of Miranda v.
Arizona2 are being undermined by the Burger Court. The latest
of these attacks is Michigan v. Mosley.3 Mosley addresses the ques-
tion of when a government official may re-interrogate a suspect
who has exercised his constitutional right to remain silent.
This Recent Development will first highlight the Miranda line of
authority that culminates in Michigan v. Mosley.4 Then the article
will present a more detailed analysis of the Mosley opinion, em-
phasizing the various procedural safeguards developed to protect an
accused in a re-interrogation situation. This analysis will provide
a foundation for a critical evaluation of the Mosley decision-its
general effect on re-questioning and its inconsistency with the dic-
tates of Miranda. Finally, the article will examine the future of
the Miranda decision.
THE FACTS OF Michigan v. Mosley
Richard Mosley was arrested on April 8, 1971, in connection with
a series of three robberies. The police brought him to the station
and read him his Miranda rights.5 An officer then began question-
ing Mosley about two of the robberies. Mosley invoked his right
to remain silent, and the officer ceased interrogation. Approxi-
mately two hours later, another officer began questioning Mosley
about a recent robbery-murder. 6 This officer deceived Mosley into
1. NWSWEFK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 46.
2. 384U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975).
4. Id.
5. 384 U.S. at 467-73.
6. 96 S. Ct. at 323. The original tip from an anonymous informer impli-
cated Mosley in three robberies and a murder. Id. n.2.
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making an inculpatory statement about the murder1 The trial
court allowed the statement into evidence, and Mosley was con-
victed of first degree murder.8 Holding that the second interroga-
tion was a per se violation of Miranda, the Michigan Court of Ap-
peal reversed and remandedP The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 0 after the denial of further appeal by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court. 1
BACKGROUND OF Mosley
Pre-Miranda
Before 1964, the test for admissibility of a defendant's confession
was voluntariness. The voluntariness of a confession was deter-
mined by the totality of the circumstances.' 2  Although the re-
peated character of an interrogation was a relevant factor in the
analysis of the totality of the circumstances, ' re-interrogation after
a suspect invoked the fifth amendment was not banned.
Escobedo v. Illinois,'4 decided in 1964, did not follow the totality
of the circumstances approach. Instead it converted several of the
former factors of the voluntariness approach into the elements of
a relatively definite rule. The Escobedo court found that denial of
counsel and failure of police to warn Escobedo of his right to remain
silent were abrogations of his constitutional rights and that the
statement was thus per se inadmissible.' 5
7. Id. at 324 n.5. The officer told Mosley that a participant in the mur-
der had confessed and had named Mosley as the "shooter." Id. at 323.
8. Id. at 324.
9. People v. Mosley, 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564 (1974). The
Michigan Court of Appeal viewed this case as similar to the companion case
in Miranda, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Michigan v. Mosley, 419 U.S. 1119 (1975).
11. People v. Mosley, 392 Mich. 764 (1974).
12. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 543 (1961); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287
(1936).
13. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957). Other rules were devel-
oped such as the McNabb-Mallory rule excluding statements resulting from
a delay in arraignment. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Mc-
Nabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1947). Also statements elicited from
defendants indicted and in absence of counsel are excludable. Beatty v.
United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
14. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo embraced a per se analysis rejected
in other cases. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959);
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433, 440-41 (1958).
15. 378 U.S. at 491.
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Miranda
Miranda v. Arizona1 6 refined the Escobedo approach by establish-
ing even more concrete guidelines for the protection of fifth
amendment rights.' 7 These concrete guidelines, which govern cus-
todial interrogation, augment the traditional standards of voluntari-
ness: 18 A confession secured even in compliance with Miranda
could be deemed involuntary and inadnissible as a matter of law.' 9
In Miranda the Supreme Court found that the process of in-custody
interrogation of a suspect contained "inherently compelling pres-
sures" which undermine the person's will and force him to speak 20
The Court created the specific warnings as a prophylactic measure
to protect the accused from the coercive atmosphere of custodial in-
terrogation.21
A single passage from Miranda emphasizes the need for protect-
ing the right to remain silent-a right that can be protected only
if interrogation ceases after the accused exercises his right to re-
main silent.
16. 384U.S. 436 (1966).
17. Id. at 441-42. Miranda was limited to cases in which trials were
begun after the date of its decision. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,
732 (1966). See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Voluntariness is
still the rule for any pre-Miranda case. Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1968); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966).
18. The Miranda Court stated that:
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other
fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise
it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the indi-
vidual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question him. 384 U.S. at
444-45.
19. See State v. Geldhart, 111 N.H. 219, 221, 279 A.2d 588, 589 (1971);
People v. Russell, 259 Cal. App. 2d 637, 649, 66 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 (1968);
State v. Walker, 416 S.W.2d 134, 142-43 (1967).
20. 384 U.S. at 467.
21. The Miranda Court stated:
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained
from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. 384
U.S. at 458.
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after
the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product
of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has once been invoked.22
A literal reading of this passage would mandate that "interrogation
must cease" forever when the accused invokes his right to remain
silent.
Post-Miranda
Since the Miranda decision, the great majority of federal and
state courts have held that Miranda does not absolutely prohibit
further questioning once the accused has elected to remain silent.25
These cases analyzing re-questioning problems fall into three cate-
gories.
The first category involves the defendant who asserts his sixth
amendment right to counsel by requesting an attorney. In that sit-
uation Miranda clearly dictates that all questioning must cease until
the defendant has consulted with counsel. 24 If there is an express
waiver of the right to counsel before re-questioning, some courts
allow a second interrogation before a suspect actually consults the
attorney.25
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) (emphasis added).
The Court continued:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individ-
ual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to
have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the indi-
vidual cannot obtain an attorney, and he indicates he wants one
before speaking to the police, they must respect his decision to re-
main silent. Id. at 474.
23. Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326 n.9 (1975). See United States
v. Rimka, 512 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir. 1975); Hill v. Whealon, 490 F.2d 629,
630-35 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 801-02 (2d
Cir. 1972); Pennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460, 466-67 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see
United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d
491, 493 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
25. See United States v. Grady, 423 F.2d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Barnawell, 341 F. Supp. 619, 621-22 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Hous-
ton v. Peyton, 297 F. Supp. 717, 721-22 (W.D. Va. 1969); State v. Turner,
281 N.C. 118, 119, 187 S.E.2d 750, 751 (1972). But see United States v. Priest,
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The second group of cases concerns the situation in which the ac-
cused waives his Miranda rights, submits to interrogation, and then
interrogation resumes after a lapse in time. As a general rule the
suspect may be re-questioned without repetition of the Miranda
warnings.
26
In the final class of cases the suspect asserts his fifth amendment
right to silence and is then re-questioned. Most courts allow re-
interrogation after exercise of the right to remain silent but with
limitations such as the repetition of Miranda warnings, 27 the dis-
covery of new grounds for questioning,2 or the initiation of conver-
sation by the suspect.29 In confessions obtained through re-ques-
tioning, Miranda allocates to the government a heavy burden of
establishing that the accused was properly advised of his rights
and knowingly and voluntarily waived them before confessing.3 0 If
409 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Nielsen 392 F.2d 849, 853
(7th Cir. 1968); Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 545 (3d Cir. 1967).
Cf. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 953-54, 464 P.2d 114, 117-18, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 658, 660-61 (1970).
26. See United States v. Hopkin, 433 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1970);
Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1968); Tucker v. United
States, 375 F.2d 363, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1967); People v. Schenk, 24 Cal. App.
3d 233, 236, 101 Cal. Rptr. 75, 76 (1972). But see United States v. Brady,
421 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1970); Davis v. State, 44 Ala. 145, 150, 204 So. 2d
490, 495 (1967); Brown v. State, 6 Md. App. 564, 567, 252 A.2d 272, 276
(1969).
27. Hill v. Whelon, 490 F.2d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d
354, 357 (7th Cir. 1970); Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512, 515-16 (5th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460, 466-67 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
See also Comment, The Need to Repeat Miranda Warnings at Subsequent
Interrogations, 12 WAsHBuRN L.J. 223-30 (1973).
28. See United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460, 465-69 (E.D. Pa. 1975); People
v. Lyons, 18 Cal. App. 3d 760, 96 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1971).
29. State v. Kroupa, 16 Ariz. App., 492 P.2d 750 (1972); People v. Fioritto,
68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1968); People v. Tomita,
260 Cal. App. 2d 88, 66 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1968); People v. Perrin, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 838, 55 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1967); Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483 (Wyo.
1975).
30. The Miranda Court stated:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to re-
tained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois.... This Court
has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitu-
tional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, . . . and we re-assert these stan-
the government can satisfy the heavy burden of proof, the majority
of federal circuits allows the introduction of subsequent statements
even though the accused had previously invoked his right to remain
silent.31
Tim Mosley DECISION: AN ANALYSIS
The Majority Opinion
The Court's analysis in Michigan v. Mosley focuses upon the in-
terpretation of a single passage from Miranda.2  Although this
passage states that "interrogation must cease" when the accused in-
vokes his right to remain silent, the Court found that the circum-
stances under which a resumption of questioning is permissible
were not delineated in Miranda.
The issue of whether a suspect's exercise of the fifth amendment
privilege precludes re-questioning presented no difficulty for the
Court.
[N]either this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opin-
ion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite
duration upon any further questioning .... 3
8
The Court rejected a strict interpretation of the Miranda passage
either as a rigid rule prohibiting any re-interrogation or even as
a rule demanding merely immediate cessation of interrogation.84
Rather, Justice Stewart underscored one sentence for the protection
of a suspect's constitutional rights. "Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
dards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Since the State is re-
sponsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which
the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making
available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incom-
municado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
384 U.S. at 475 (footnotes omitted).
31. See Hill v. Whealon, 490 F.2d 629, 630 (6th Cir. 1974), citing Hughes
v. Swenson, 452 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1971):
It is neither necessary nor desirable to undertake to fashion a per
se rule to be applied in all cases presenting the Miranda issue. The
crucial question always must be: has the prosecution sustained its
heavy burden of demonstrating that the defendant was effectively
advised of his rights; and did he knowingly and understandingly
decline to exercise them... ? Id. at 888.
See also United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796-98 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460, 465-69 (E.D. Pa. 1975); cf. United Slates
v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d
491, 493 (5th Cir. 1969); Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 490-91 (Wyo. 1975).
32. Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321, 325 (1975). See note 22 and accom-
panying text supra.
33. Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326 (1975).
34. Id.
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individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked."3 5 The Court asserted that the
government must "scrupulously honor" that right.36
Scrupulous honor for the accused's "right to cut off questioning"
is the procedure the Court seized upon as the suspect's protection
from the coercive pressures inherent in custodial interrogation.3
7
The Court found that through the exercise of this power the de-
fendant could control the time, subject, and manner of the interro-
gation. Inculpatory admissions obtained during the re-questioning
of a subject who has exercised his right to silence would be admis-
sible only if the government could show that the "right to cut off
questioning" was "scrupulously honored."38
While reviewing the circumstances of Mosley's confession, Justice
Stewart identified several factors relevant to the determination of
whether the government had scrupulously honored the suspect's
rights. First, the "passage of a significant period of time"3 9
between Mosley's exercise of his right to silence and the attempt
to re-question was an important factor.40  Too short a time
lapse would permit a resumption after only a momentary delay
and would defeat the intentions of Miranda. Second, a different
officer conducted the interrogation at a different location and gave
a fresh set of Miranda warnings.41 The third and most important
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
36. 96 S. Ct. at 326.
37. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements ob-
tained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent
depends under Miranda on whether his "right to cut off question-
ing" was "scrupulously honored." Id. at 326.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 326-27.
40. In Mosley a little over two hours elapsed between the exercise of
the right to remain silent and the re-interrogation. Id. at 226. But
see United States v. Westover, 384 U.S. 436, 496 (1966) (where a fourteen-
hour separation between interrogations was close enough to be considered
part of the same interrogation process); United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d
802, 807 (4th Cir. 1974) (where four hours was not considered a significant
lapse of time).
41. The Court stated:
After an interval of more than two hours, Mosley was questioned
by another police officer at another location about an unrelated
holdup murder. 96 S. Ct. at 326-27.
The factors of a different police officer and different location gain signifi-
cance in light of dictum from Westover. See text accompanying note 55
infra and the comments in the dissent, Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321,
333-34 n.7 (1975).
circumstance to the Court was the restriction of the scope of Mos-
ley's second interrogation to a crime not discussed at the prior in-
terrogation.42 The character of the Court's analysis reflects a desire
for two distinct interrogation sessions in order to demonstrate the
"scrupulous honoring" of the suspect's first exercise of the right to
cut off questioning. Apparently the lead opinion contemplates that
the trial judge will weigh all the factors in a particular case.
The Dissent
Justices Brennan and Marshall, the remaining Warren Court Jus-
tices, agreed that Miranda did not dictate a blanket prohibition of
re-questioning after the exercise of the right to remain silent. How-
ever, they did believe that Miranda dictated establishing "con-
crete constitutional guidelines" for the resumption of questioning.
43
For the dissent, the real issue in Mosley was "whether the proce-
dures approved will be sufficient to assure with reasonable cer-
tainty that a confession is not obtained under the influence of the
compulsion inherent in interrogation and detention."44 An almost
irrebuttable presumption of compulsion burdens confessions which
are the product of renewed questioning. Adherence to strict proce-
dural safeguards is the only method to overcome this presumption.
Justice Brennan mentioned two guidelines which he considers
sensitive to the reality of the inherent compulsion of in-custody in-
terrogation: either the suspect should be arraigned before a judi-
cial officer "without unnecessary delay,' '4  or the questioning
should be resumed only in the presence of counsel.40 Either of
these two methods would be adequate to assure the absence of
compulsion upon re-questioning.47
The Concurrence
Justice White urged the Court to adopt a standard of voluntari-
ness to judge the waiver of the right to silence. He reads Miranda
42. 96 S. Ct. at 327.
43. Id. at 330 (dissenting opinion).
44. Id. at 331.
45. Id. at 332. After arraignment the guidelines established in Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), which exclude deliberately elicited
statements in absence of counsel after indictment, are applicable. As the
dissent points out, Michigan law requires that a suspect be arraigned "with-
out unnecessary delay." Thus, if Mosley had been promptly arraigned after
arrest, his inculpatory statement would have been excluded because of the
absence of counsel. 96 S. Ct. at 332 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
46. 96 S. Ct. at 332 (dissenting opinion).
47. Id. at 332-33.
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as allowing re-questioning immediately after the exercise of the
right to remain silent, provided that the government satisfies the
heavy burden of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver of
rights.48 For Justice White, a voluntary waiver of rights, followed
by a statement, is admissible even if made immediately after the
exercise of the right to remain silent. Not to allow voluntary state-
ments would "rob the accused of the choice to answer questions vol-
untarily for some unspecified period of time following his own pre-
vious contrary decision."
49
A CRmcAL EVALUATION OF Mosley
On the surface, Michigan v. Mosley appears to be a narrow hold-
ing, limited by several factors. The ability to re-question may be
exercised only after the passage of a "significant period of time"
after the repetition of Miranda warnings by another police officer
at a different location and if the scope of questioning is restricted
to a crime not the subject of the previous interrogation.50 Al-
though Mosley gave the police the power to re-question, the scope
of this power would appear severely limited to those instances when
two separate interrogations have occurred.
However this narrow interpretation of MosZey may misread the
Burger Court's true attitude toward re-interrogation. The Court's
treatment of the facts, its dicta, and the analytic approach of Mosley
all evidence a favorable attitude toward re-interrogation.
The Court's analysis of the circumstances of Mosley's confession
creates the impression that two distinct interrogations were con-
ducted. The Court stated that the second interrogation was "at an-
other location." In fact this other location was a different floor of
the same police station.5 1 Also, the Court continually emphasized
that the subject matter of the second interrogation concerned an
"unrelated crime." Nevertheless, the informant's tip which served
as the basis of Mosley's arrest implicated him in both crimes.52 This
48. Id. at 329. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Hill
v. Whealon, 490 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1974).
49. 96 S. Ct. at 330.
50. Id. at 327. See notes 27 and 41 supra.
51. 96 S. Ct. at 333 n.7. See note 41 supra.
52. 96 S. Ct. at 333 n.7. The majority also failed to address the issue of the
scope of the right to remain silent. Mosley refused to answer "anything
about robberies." The question of whether that refusal includes only the
was not discovery of new evidence which could create a reasonable
basis for re-questioning. 53 In order to comply with dictum from
a companion case to Miranda, the Court strains to find two separate
interrogations in a factual setting containing only a single continu-
ous interrogation. The Court, in Westover v. United States,54 stated:
We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are precluded
from questioning any individual who has been held for a period
of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without ap-
propriate warnings. A different case would be presented if an ac-
cused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed
both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then
adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exer-
cise them. But here the FBI interrogation was conducted immedi-
ately following the state interrogation in the same police station-
in the same compelling surroundings.5 5
The Mosley Court gave lip service to the procedural dictates of Mi-
randa while ignoring the impact of what was actually continuous
questioning of the accused.
Like the coloring of the facts, the Court's dictum in the Mosley
opinion suggests a favorable attitude toward re-questioning sus-
pects after the exercise of the right to remain silent.
Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the
Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription
of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police
officer on any subject once the person in custody has indicated a
desire to remain silent.5 6
Although the Court creates various limiting factors, this broad dic-
tum sanctions the liberal use of re-questioning.
Finally, the Court's analytic approach, using a multitude of fac-
tors, including shift of location, lapse of time between interroga-
tions, repeated warnings, and a restricted scope of questioning, is
reminiscent of the pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances"
test.57 Although the Court emphasized the restricted scope of the
first interrogation about robberies or both discussions is not addressed by
the Court. Id. at 334 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
53. See note 28 supra.
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. Id. The Court in Mosley distinguishes the Michigan Court of Ap-
peal's reliance on Westover by stating:
The cardinal fact of Westover-the failure of the police officers to
give any warnings whatever to the person in their custody before
embarking on an intense and prolonged interrogation of him-was
simply not present in this case. 96 S. Ct. at 327-28.
Despite this language, the Court, through a manipulation of the facts, at-
tempts to place the circumstances of Mosley in what may be an exception
to the strict rule of Miranda, found in the language of Westover.
56. 96 S. Ct. at 326 (emphasis added).
57. See notes 11 and 12 supra.
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second interrogation, it did not elevate this factor to a per se exclu-
sion test as was used in Miranda. Each factor is merely an element
in the separateness of the interrogations. In future cases any one
factor may be determinative.5
8
Is this vague "totality of the circumstances" approach of the Mos-
ley Court consistent with the dictates of Miranda? Miranda mani-
fested the Warren Court's recognition of the intensely compulsive
atmosphere permeating stationhouse interrogations which reduces
an accused's ability to knowledgeably exercise his fifth amendment
rights. 9
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights
by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado
incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the
accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances
the fact that the individual eventually made a statement. . . is in-
consistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the
privilege.6 0
Thus Michigan v. Mosley slights the core problem of the pressures
of police interrogation and instead focuses upon the creation of
vague procedural tests. As Justice Brennan stated in dissent:
"[S] crupulously honoring exercises of the right to cut off question-
ing is only meaningful insofar as the suspects' will to exercise that
right remains wholly unfettered." 61 The Mosley Court ignores the
question which would have been the key issue for the Miranda
Court: Would interrogation after incommunicado detention and
previous interrogations affect a suspect's will to exercise his right
to cut off questioning?62 Mosley formally honors the procedures
of Miranda while abandoning its central premise.
Mosley is inconsistent with Miranda in another aspect. Miranda
specified the presence of counsel as the procedural safeguard for
re-questioning after exercise of the right to remain silent:
58. See George, Future Trends in the Administration of Criminal Justice,
69 1vLT. L.R. 1, 5-32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as George].
59. 384 U.S. at 445-58 (1966).
60. Id. at 476.
61. 96 S. Ct. at 331 (dissenting opinion).
62. Id. at 331-32. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court stated:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely. 384 U.S. at 467.
If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an
attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further
questioning would be permissible. In the absence of evidence of
overbearing, statements then made in the presence of counsel might
be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process and
might fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposes
of these statements. 3
These procedures reinforced Miranda's discussion of the role of
counsel during interrogation. "The presence of counsel, in all the
cases before us today, would be the adequate protective device nec-
essary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the
dictates of the privilege. 064 A literal reading of Miranda indicates
that the only time re-questioning would be allowed after the exer-
cise of the right to remain silent would be in the presence of coun-
sel.
On this matter the Mosley Court attempts to distinguish the lan-
guage of Miranda, finding the above passage relevant only when
an attorney is present at the time the accused initially asserts his
right to remain silent.65 However this language is held inapplicable
to Mosley because the accused did not have counsel present when
he exercised his privilege. The Mosley Court's interpretation seems
untenable given Miranda's treatment of the presence of counsel as
the adequate protective device.
CoNcLusioN: THE FUTupE OF Miranda
The inconsistency between Miranda and Mosley highlights the
philosophical shift of the Supreme Court since 1971. The Warren
Court believed that it should set strict standards of criminal proce-
dure for the lower federal and state courts to follow.60 The Court
found the greatest need for judicial intervention was in the investi-
gatory phase of a criminal case. 67 Thus the purpose of Miranda was
63. 384 U.S. at 474 n.44.
64. Id. at 466 (emphasis added). The Court continued:
The presence of an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the in-
dividual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circum-
stances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that
eliminates the evils in the interrogation process. Without the pro-
tections flowing from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel,
"all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony,
whether by an accused or any other witness, would become empty
formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evi-
dence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at
the unsupervised pleasure of the police .... " Id.
65. 96 S. Ct. at 332-33 n.5.
66. George 2. For the purpose of this analysis, the Warren Court is the
United States Supreme Court from 1963-1970. The Burger Court extends
from 1971 to the present. Id. at 1.
67. Id. at 2.
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"to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow. 68 The creation of explicit guidelines
which, if violated, cause the confession to be per se excluded, effec-
tively limits the lower court's discretion in the admission of evi-
dence. By adhering to the per se exclusionary rules, the trial court
would force government officials to follow procedural guidelines in
order to obtain convictions. The Warren Court accomplished its
purpose of limiting to some extent police misconduct during the
investigatory phase.
In contrast the Burger Court does not view itself as a promulgator
of national criminal procedure standards.6 9 This Court gives more
discretion to the legislatures and lower courts in formulating crim-
inal procedure policy70 The use of indefinite standards, such as
those in Mosley, represents a deliberate movement towards a reallo-
cation of responsibility within the political system.71 These vague
standards provide more discretion to the lower court judge in the
introduction of contestable evidence: The trial judge no longer has
certainty of reversal to influence his discretion. Law enforcement
officials thus have greater discretion in the investigatory process,
for concrete guidelines no longer bind them. The responsibility
for controlling police conduct has shifted to trial courts and to state
legislatures.
72
68. 384 U.S. at 441-42. See Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321, 331 (1975)
(Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
69. George 5, 18, 26-28.
70. George 2. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), where the
Court states: "Federal courts should not be quick to conclude that simply
because a state procedure does not conform to the corresponding federal
statute or rule, it does not serve a legitimate state policy." Id. at 468. But
see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
71. George 31-33; Speech by Yale Kamisar, Professor of Law, University
of Michigan, before the Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville,
Va., The Burger Court Slides Down the Mountain, at 26 (1973). Professor
Kamisar believes the Burger Court is encouraging the lower federal and
state courts to disregard the "landmark" decisions such as Miranda by fail-
ing to "rescue" these decisions when they are disregarded.
72. George 31-33. The shift of responsibility for the formulation of crim-
inal procedure policy has resulted in many state courts imposing higher
criminal procedure standards based on their state constitutions. The dissent
in Mosley observes that this is the last bastion for the remaining procedural
safeguards. 96 S. Ct. at 334. See Pennsylvania v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d
700 (1971); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); State v.
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). These decisions are subject to
This philosophical contrast is readily apparent in Michigan V.
Mosley. The majority offers the vague test of "scrupulously honor-
ing of the right to cut off questioning" as the procedural safeguard
for the accused during custodial interrogation. 73 The two Warren
Court Justices, Brennan and Marshall, argue for "concrete guide-
lines," stating that a suspect must either be arraigned or obtain
counsel before questioning may resume.
74
In Mosley Justice Stewart reiterated:
Neither party in the present case challenges the continuing validity
of the Miranda decision, nor of any of the so-called guidelines it
established to protect what the Court there said was a person's con-
stitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 75
Nevertheless, the Court in essence has moved perceptibly farther
away from the Miranda rationale towards the pre-Miranda stand-
ard of voluntariness.
Viewed in context with Harris v. New York,
70 Oregon v. Hass,77
and Michigan v. Tucker,78 Mosley represents a further erosion of
Miranda's theoretical base. This pattern of erosion was first estab-
lished with Harris. In that case the suspect was given defective
Miranda warnings. Inculpatory statements taken from him were
admitted to impeach his credibility even though the statements
were inadmissible to prove the prosecution's case in chief.79 The
Miranda exclusionary rule was held inapplicable to the impeaching
statements. Hass also dealt with the impeachment of a defendant
who was improperly warned. The Court balanced the deterrence
to the police from exclusion of evidence for impeachment against
the need to prevent perjurious testimony.80
Similarly, Tucker distinguished police conduct which violates the
suspect's right against compulsory self-incrimination from conduct
which "instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to
protect that right."81 Thus products of true compulsion are exclud-
able as a violation of the fifth amendment. When a violation of
the limitation that the state courts base their opinion upon an interpretation
of their state constitution and not the federal constitution. Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
73. 96 S. Ct. at 326.
74. Id. at 332-33 (dissenting opinion).
75. Id. at 324.
76. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
77. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
78. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
79. 401 U.S. at 225-26. See George 13-14.
80. 420 U.S. at 721-23.
81. 417 U.S. at 439.
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only Miranda guidelines occurs, the per se rule is abandoned and
a balancing test is applied.
[W]hen balancing the interests involved, we must weigh the strong
interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier
of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which
either party seeks to adduce.8 2
This interest of society is balanced against the desire to control un-
authorized police conduct.
Michigan v. Mosley also adopts a balancing approach to the Mi-
randa exclusionary rule. At first Mosley appears to have a narrow
impact. However, the broader implications of the opinion demon-
strate the tendency of the Burger Court and many lower courts 3
to erode the Miranda decision by slowly cutting away at each of
the procedural safeguards. The pattern emerging is the creation
of a multitude of exceptions to riddle the Miranda rule. Mosley
fits this pattern, severely limiting the practical value of an accused's
right to remain silent by allowing repeated interrogations.
FFEi1ucK M. Boss
82. Id. at 450.
83. The extent to which Miranda has been limited by lower federal and
state courts is extensive. Miranda is inapplicable to misdemeanors involv-
ing only a small fine or short jail time. State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d
792 (Iowa 1971); Shumate v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 877, 153 S.E.2d 243
(1967). Miranda is also inapplicable to international border custom proce-
dures. Chavez-Martinez v. United States, 407 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1969). It
is inapplicable to license revocation proceedings. F.J. Buckner Corp. v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1968), and welfare investigations. State
v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 291 A.2d 2 (1972). Miranda was held inapplicable
to drunk driving situations. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504
(Fla. App. 1971); People v. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 321 N.Y. Supp. 2d 570,
270 N.E.2d 297 (1971). Miranda is also inapplicable in extradition proceed-
ings. North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969).
